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CRIMINAL LAW
INSTRUCTING DEADLOCKED JURIES: USE OF SECOND Allen CHARGE
NOT ERROR Per Se
United States v. Robinson
Courts have long recognized that a criminal trial judge has
broad discretion to give supplemental instructions to a deadlocked
jury.' On the federal level, these instructions are embodied in the
Allen,2 or "dynamite," '3 charge, which directs jurors to listen to each
other with a disposition to be convinced, as they have a duty to
I See, e.g., Allis v. United States, 155 U.S. 117, 123 (1894). Since a deadlocked jury
necessarily results in a mistrial, many have viewed it as a failure of the judicial system. See,
e.g., 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1167, 1168 (1971). The common law courts' scorn for hung juries
sometimes resulted in trial judges compelling juries to produce verdicts. Bennett, The Hung
Jury and the Dynamite Charge, 1 Arii. J. CrmM. L. 156 (1972); see Comment, Instructing
Deadlocked Juries in Light of the Trial of Juan Corona, 53 ORE. L. REv. 213, 213-14 (1974).
Modern cases occasionally reflect a similarly harsh treatment of juries. See Commonwealth
v. Moore, 398 Pa. 198, 157 A.2d 65 (1959); Mead v. City of Richland Center, 237 Wis. 537,
297 N.W. 419 (1941).
1 The Allen charge derives its name from the Supreme Court decision in Allen v. United
States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). In affirming Allen's conviction, the Court approved the trial
judge's supplemental charge to the jury which was modeled after that given in Common-
wealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 1 (1851). 164 U.S. at 501-02. The Allen Court paraphrased
the instruction in this way:
[T]hat in a large proportion of cases absolute certainty could not be expected; that
although the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror, and not a mere
acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they should examine the question
submitted with candor and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of
each other; that it was their duty to decide the case if they could conscientiously
do so; that they should listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's
arguments; that, if much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror
should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no impression
upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself.
If, upon the other hand, the majority was for acquittal, the minority ought to ask
themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment
which was not concurred in by the majority.
Id. at 501. See generally United States v. Bailey, 468 F.2d 652, 661-69 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'd
per curiam, 480 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1973)(en banc). Noting the peculiarities of the case and
the decision, the Bailey court commented "[t]hat it should have become the foundation-
stone of all modem law regarding deadlocked juries is perhaps the greatest anomaly of the
Allen case." 468 F.2d at 666. See also Note, On Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 78 YALE L.J.
100, 102 n.12 (1968).
- The usual explanation for the use of the term "dynamite" is that, like dynamite, the
Allen charge ought to be used with care because of its explosive effects on a deadlocked jury:
"The Allen or 'dynamite' charge is designed to blast loose a deadlocked jury." Green v. United
States, 309 F.2d 852, 854 (5th Cir. 1962). The charge has also been called the "nitroglycerin
charge," Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir.) (Brown, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955 (1962), the "third degree instruction,"
Leech v. People, 112 Colo. 120, 123, 146 P.2d 346, 347 (1944), and the "shotgun instruction,"
State v. Nelson, 63 N.M. 428, 431, 321 P.2d 202, 204 (1958).
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decide the case if they can conscientiously do so.4 In addition, the
jurors comprising the minority are usually specifically addressed
and encouraged to reconsider their position in light of the majority
view.5 The Allen charge is rendered in the hope that it will generate
renewed jury deliberation culminating in a verdict.' Such a result
averts the declaration of a mistrial and the need for retrial and
thereby promotes judicial economy.7 Notwithstanding the Allen
charge's utility in this regard, questions have been raised as to the
propriety of its use.8 At issue is the possibility of judicial coercion
which may jeopardize a defendant's right to a unanimous, impartial
verdict
Criticism of the Allen charge has led to its abandonment by a
See note 2 supra. The precise wording of the Allen charge varies. Compare United
States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 511-12 n.6 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc), with United States v.
Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159, 1161 n.2 (9th Cir. 1977).
1 See, e.g., United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1977); Green v. United
States, 309 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1961);
State v. Randall, 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d 1054 (1960).
' E.g., Campbell v. United States, 316 F.2d 681, 681 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Green v. United
States, 309 F.2d 852, 854-55 n.3 (5th Cir. 1962); see Note, The Allen Charge: Recurring
Problems and Recent Developments, 47 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 296, 297-98 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Recurring Problems]. A jury initially unable to agree on a verdict need not be summarily
discharged. The courts have encountered difficulty, however, in fashioning a method that will
encourage consensus but not cause any juror to feel compelled to agree with the majority
despite his own reservations. See Comment, Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite: A Critical
Look at the "Allen Charge," 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 386 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Deadlocked
Juries].
I Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy and the Hung Jury: A Reexamination of the
Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. Rav. 123, 125 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Reexamination]. One
authority has urged that economic considerations should not be a factor in the giving of an
Allen charge: "To me, expense is never a consideration either to be mentioned or entertained
in the dispensation of justice." Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 740 (5th Cir.
1965)(Coleman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966). The economic benefits
derived from fewer retrials, moreover, appear to be offset by the frequent appeals occasioned
by use of the charge. Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1962) (Wisdom,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 946 (1963).
1 Although it is unquestioned that the Allen charge produces more verdicts than would
otherwise result, constitutional and administrative problems may result from its use. See
notes 33-50 and accompanying text infra.
I See Note, The Allen Charge Dilemma, 10 AM. CaM. L. REV. 637 (1972). Although
judicial coercion is difficult to define and measure, United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407,
416 n.20 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969), appellate courts will find coercion to exist
when the charge causes a minority juror to substitute mechanically the majority opinion for
his own. See Deadlocked Juries, supra note 6, at 386-87. This finding entails a careful analysis
of the circumstances surrounding the charge. See note 22 infra. For an analysis of the dynam-
ics and factors involved in jury deliberations, see Note, On Instructing Deadlocked Juries,
78 YALE L.J. 100 (1968), wherein it is contended that no present method exists by which the
courts can adequately determine whether a jury was coerced. Id. at 105. See also State v.
Voeckell, 69 Ariz. 145, 210 P.2d 972 (1949) (Udall, J., dissenting).
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number of courts in recent years.o Despite this concern with the
appropriateness of the charge, the Second Circuit, in United States
v. Robinson," recently held that the giving of a second Allen charge
is neither necessarily coercive nor error per se. '2 At defendant Cecil
Robinson's bank robbery trial, the jury deliberated for 5 hours and
found itself deadlocked eleven to one for conviction.'" The court
advised counsel of the deadlock and thereupon delivered a modified
Allen charge to the jury." Three hours later, a juror sought advice
in a note to the court stating that she still had a "strong reasonable
doubt" as to the defendant's guilt." The following morning a short,
modified Allen charge was given in response to the juror's note.'6
Almost 5 hours after this second charge, the jury voted to convict."
The Second Circuit, sitting en banc, ruled that the delivery of
the second Allen charge to the deadlocked jury did not constitute
reversible error.'8 Judge Mansfield, authoring the majority opin-
,o See United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc); United States
v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969); United States v.
Brown, 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970). See note 43 infra.
Commentators have joined the judiciary in expressing criticism of the charge. A noted
authority has stated that "[d]espite the durability of the Allen charge under heavy attack,
its ultimate demise seems clearly indicated. In law, as in other matters, error cannot perma-
nently endure. The Allen charge is error." C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CRIMINAL § 502, at 360 (1969). See also Recurring Problems, supra note 6; Reexamination,
supra note 7; Deadlocked Juries, supra note 6.
560 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc), rev'g 544 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1976).
22 560 F.2d at 517.
" Id. at 511.
2 Id. The precise division of the jury was not made known to counsel. Id.
" Id. at 512. In her note, the juror advised the court that "'regardless of honest efforts
of my co-jurors to persuade me, I am unable to reach a decision without a strong reasonable
doubt.'" Id. The judge sealed the note and did not disclose the contents to the parties. The
sealing of the note was found not to constitute prejudicial error. Id. at 516-17.
11 Id. at 512. In his opening remarks the following morning the trial judge said that
the only response that I can give to that note is to state again for you some of what
I stated yesterday afternoon, that is, you should examine the questions submitted
to you with candor and with a proper regard for and deference to the opinions of
one another; you should listen to one anothers' views with a disposition to be
convinced.
That does not mean that you should give up any conscientious views that you
hold, but it is your duty after full deliberation, to agree upon a verdict, if you can
do so without violating your individual judgment and your individual conscience.
Id.
27 Id.
" The en banc court was also confronted with the question whether the trial court abused
its discretion in admitting evidence of Robinson's possession of a .38 caliber handgun at the
time of his arrest, 10 weeks after the bank robbery. Robinson was said to have been one of
four men who participated in the robbery. Ten weeks after the crime he was arrested when
one of the suspects confessed and identified Robinson as an accomplice. Id. at 512. Besides
this testimony, the government found Robinson's fingerprint in the back seat of the getaway
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:285
ion,1 noted that a carefully worded supplemental instruction is per-
mitted in order to provide guidance for confused or deadlocked ju-
ries.2" Such a charge is proper, according to the Second Circuit, if it
car owned by his friend. On the day of the robbery, Robinson was absent from work. Bank
surveillance photographs could not positively identify Robinson, nor could the witnesses in
the bank. Id. at 510-11. At trial, Judge Bryan admitted testimony as to Robinson's possession
of the gun, since his alleged coparticipant had testified that four guns had been used in the
robbery, including at least one .38 caliber revolver. Judge Bryan did not allow the gun itself
to be put into evidence. Cautionary instructions were employed, informing the jury that
testimony concerning Robinson's possession of the gun was to be used solely for purposes of
establishing his identity as one of the participants in the robbery. The jury was specifically
cautioned that they should not speculate on Robinson's character or reputation. Id. at 510-
11 & 510 n.4.
A Second Circuit panel reversed Robinson's conviction on appeal, holding that the ad-
mission of the testimony under the circumstances of the case was reversible error, since the
potential prejudice from the testimony substantially outweighed its probative value. 544 F.2d
at 615-16. Judge Oakes, writing for himself and Judge Gurfein, viewed the testimony regard-
ing the gun as establishing only a weak inference that Robinson was one of the bank robbers.
Although relevant, since the testimony was likely to have had a significant prejudicial impact
on the minds of the jurors, and as the circumstances of the case were "exceedingly close,"
reversal was required. Id. at 616. Judge Mansfield, in his dissent, believed the gun testimony
to have substantial probative value and found no abuse of discretion by the trial judge. Id.
at 623-24 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
The en banc court vacated the panel judgment and reinstated Robinson's conviction.
Judge Mansfield stated in the majority opinion that broad discretion is accorded the trial
judge because he is in a superior position to assess the impact of the evidence on the basis of
his personal observation of the trial. 560 F.2d at 514. In noting that the trial judge's determi-
nation will rarely he overruled, the en banc majority found the "preferable rule is to uphold
the trial judge's exercise of discretion unless he acts arbitrarily or irrationally." Id. at 515.
Analyzing the trial judge's actions, Judge Mansfield found a sound basis for the admittance
of the testimony. The trial judge had acted to minimize the impact of the evidence by
admitting only testimony and not the gun itself, and by employing cautionary instructions.
These factors led the majority to conclude that the trial judge had not acted arbitrarily or
unreasonably. Id. at 514-16.
In his dissent, Judge Oakes took issue with the majority's reasoning. He noted that
"'great discretion in the trial judge . . . does not mean immunity from accountability.'"
Id. at 519 (Oakes, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Dwyer, 539 F.2d 924, 928 (2d Cir.
1976)). Judge Oakes found the connection beween the evidence of Robinson's possession of
the gun and his participation in the robbery to be slight as compared to the potential preju-
dice involved. 560 F.2d at 521-22 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
11 A majority of the Second Circuit judges joined in Judge Mansfield's opinion. Judges
Oakes, Gurfein, and Feinberg dissented. Judge Oakes viewed the Allen charge holding as
"bad law." 560 F.2d at 518 (Oakes, J., dissenting). Judge Gurfein concurred in Judge Oakes'
dissent and added that he believed the case should not have been heard en banc. Id. at 525-
26 (Gurfein, J., dissenting). Judge Feinberg would have vacated the order for rehearing en
banc, believing it to be improvidently granted. Id. at 526 (Feinberg, J., dissenting). He noted
that no new rule of law was announced by the court and thus en banc treatment of the case
was not warranted. Judge Feinberg concluded that the convening of the en banc court
simply because "a majority of the active judges disagree with" a panel decision "miscon-
ceivels] the purpose of the extraordinary en banc procedure." Id.
560 F.2d at 517 (citing United States v. Hynes, 424 F.2d 754, 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 933 (1970)). For a discussion of the problem of distinguishing between legitimate
guidance and coercive interference, see Note, The Allen Charge Dilemma, 10 AM. CrM. L.
REv. 637, 639-44 (1972).
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assists the jurors in their deliberations by stressing the importance
of reaching a verdict without forcing any juror to yield a conscien-
tious belief.2' Stating that an "individualized determination of coer-
cion" is required before the giving of an Allen charge can be held
reversible error,22 the court proceeded to examine the circumstances
surrounding the trial court's delivery of the charge.13 Declaring that
the particular wording of the charges fell "far short of being coer-
cive, '"24 and taking note of the length of jury deliberation following
each charge,25 the court concluded that the coercive effect of the
22 560 F.2d at 517.
' Id. Usually the permissibility of the instruction is determined by considering the
totality of the circumstances in which it was given. See Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S.
445, 446 (1965). The balancing process has concerned itself with three areas in recent years:
the wording of the charge, the timing of the charge, and the weight of the evidence. See
Recurring Problems, supra note 6, at 302.
Proper wording of the charge usually involves two counterbalancing elements: if the
charge requests the minority to reconsider their position in light of the majority's view, it
should also remind them of the importance of each juror maintaining a conscientious belief.
Id. at 299; Reexamination, supra note 7, at 128-30. While it has been suggested that the court
admonish the majority jurors to reconsider in light of the minority view, this has been chided
as "an invitation to a frolic with Alice in Wonderland." United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d
407, 417 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969). Problems arise if the trial judge notes in
the charge that retrial would be expensive, that a deadlock will necessitate retrial, and that
leniency could be expected for the defendant. Recurring Problems, supra note 6, at 303-04.
The timing of the charge is analyzed with respect to the length of time between the
beginning of deliberations and the giving of the charge, and the length of time between the
giving of the charge and the rendering of the verdict. If either time is considered too brief
under the circumstances, there is an inference of coercion and reversal will generally result.
Reexamination, supra note 7, at 132-33.
Appellate courts will sometimes consider the quantum of evidence presented at trial
against the defendant in gauging the likelihood of coercion. If the evidence points to guilt, a
technically improper charge might be found to be non-reversible error. Recurring Problems,
supra note 6, at 308-09. From a pragmatic standpoint the tests used by appellate courts in
measuring the coercive effect of an instruction are imprecise, see United States v. Brown, 411
.F.2d 930, 932-33 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970), as the factors causing
jurors to change their position cannot be proven or assessed accurately, Note, The Allen
Charge Dilemma, 10 AM. CamM. L. REv. 637, 642 (1972); see Reexamination, supra note 7, at
136-37.
560 F.2d at 517-18.
2, Id. at 517. Judge Bryan's first charge in Robinson stressed the desirability of a verdict,
the time and effort involved in the trial, and the probability of retrial before another jury if
a decision was not reached. The jurors were instructed to listen to each other with proper
deference and regard but not to yield a conscientious belief. Id. at 511-12 n.6. The second
charge was brief and summarized the first. Id. at 512.
1 Id. at 517-18. The jury deliberated for 3 hours after the first Allen charge and for more
than 4 hours following the second. Id. Although the Second Circuit will consider the length
of time between the delivery of the Allen charge and the jury's return with a verdict in
attempting to measure the coercive effect of the instruction, see, e.g., United States v. Bar-
ash, 412 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 832 (1969), the time factor alone will not
necessitate a reversal. See United States v. Hynes, 424 F.2d 754 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 399
1978]
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charges was minimal.26 The en banc majority therefore affirmed the
defendant's conviction.27
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Oakes characterized the second
charge to the jury as impermissibly coercive.28 Stressing that the
trial judge was aware of the eleven to one jury split before he gave
the first Allen charge, Judge Oakes contended that the second
charge created a feeling of isolation on the part of the dissenting
juror and seemed to add the court's influence to the side of the jury
majority.29 In light of these circumstances, he reasoned, the delivery
of a second charge necessitated that the conviction be reversed.3 1
It is submitted that the Second Circuit's holding in Robinson
may endanger the sixth amendment rights of defendants and
impede appellate review in the circuit. It frequently has been stated
that a single Allen charge, mirroring the charge endorsed nearly a
century ago by the Supreme Court, "stands at the brink of imper-
missible coercion."" The coercive effects of the charge are increased
by the preeminent position of the trial judge and the resultant psy-
chological impact of his instructions on dissenting jurors.32
U.S. 933 (1970) (conviction affirmed where the verdict was reported 5 minutes after the giving
of the Allen charge).
Sometimes the interval between the retiring of the jury and the delivery of the instruction
is so short that a reviewing court will find that the trial court abused its discretion in urging
agreement. Reexamination, supra note 7, at 132; see Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127
(5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 946 (1963).
" Although the court ostensibly applied a "totality of circumstances" test, it seems
apparent that the impact of the second charge on the lone holdout was not adequately
considered. See note 30 infra.
21 560 F.2d at 509.
Id. at 525 (Oakes, J., dissenting). Judge Oakes stated that the court was making
"new-and I think bad-law in its disposition of the double Allen charge point." Id. at 518.
Id. at 525. Many authorities accept the view that delivering an Allen charge when there
is a lone holdout juror creates a sense of isolation on the juror's part and gives the impression
that the court is specifically directing its remarks to the holdout. United States v. Meyers,
410 F.2d 693, 697 (2d Cir.) (Smith, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969);
Recurring Problems, supra note 6, at 306-08; Reexamination, supra note 7, at 130-32. It has
been stated that "[tihe charge usually comes at a psychological low point in the proceedings
when suggestions calculated to bring agreement are apt to be met with less than ordinary
critical evaluation." Deadlocked Juries, supra note 6, at 388-89. See also United States v.
Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1349 (4th Cir. 1970) (Soboloff, J., dissenting).
31 560 F.2d at 525 (Oakes, J., dissenting). Judge Oakes examined the totality of the
circumstances and concluded that there existed a high potential for coercion. Id. at 524-25.
The gravity of a second charge in this situation cannot be minimized. As the dissent noted,
the lone holdout juror knew that the second charge was directed at her: "Her note told the
judge that she was the holdout, so that he knew to whom his remarks were addressed, and
she knew that he knew." Id. at 525.
1' United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977); accord, United States
v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 420 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969); Green v. United
States, 309 F.2d 852, 854-55 (5th Cir. 1962).
32 The Supreme Court has recognized the great impact of the trial judge on juries:
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Constitutional attack on the Allen charge has therefore been
continual. The protection of dissenting juror's conscientiously held
conviction seems fundamental to the trial-by-jury guarantee.34
When judicial guidance exceeds its instructive purpose and inter-
feres with the jury's independent deliberations, the sixth amend-
ment may be diluted.35 Absent any indication from the Supreme
Court that reconsideration of the Allen case is imminent, 3 however,
"[H]is lightest word or intimation is received with deference and may prove controlling."
Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626 (1894).
The thought process of a minority juror after hearing the Allen charge has been depicted
in one opinion in the following manner:
The majority think he is guilty; the Court thinks I ought to agree with the
majority so the Court must think he is guilty. While the Court did tell me not to
surrender my conscientious convictions, he told me to doubt seriously the correct-
ness of my own judgment. The Court was talking directly to me, since I am the one
who is keeping everyone from going home. So I will just have to change my vote.
State v. Voeckell, 69 Ariz. 145, 155, 210 P.2d 972, 980 (1949) (Udall, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original).
" See, e.g., Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 739 (5th Cir. 1965) (Coleman, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966); Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 755
(5th Cir.) (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955
(1962); Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 275 A.2d 299 (1971); Note, The Allen Charge
Dilemma, 10 Am. Cram. L. REv. 637 (1972); Reexamination, supra note 7, at 136-44. The early
dissents of Fifth Circuit judges, see note 44 infra, were couched in constitutional terms. As
yet, no federal court has declared the Allen charge unconstitutional per se. One state court,
however, has found the charge to be "contrary to the hallowed tradition of trial by jury
secured by both our federal and state constitutions." Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328,
336, 275 A.2d 299, 304 (1971), discussed in 76 DICK. L. REv. 614 (1972).
-" See, e.g., United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en bane); United States v. Fioravanti, 412
F.2d 407, 417 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969). Pressuring a dissenting minority
juror to join the majority raises constitutional issues regarding one's right to a unanimous
impartial verdict. In enumerating its reasons for abandoning the Allen charge, the Third
Circuit noted that "it is often a conscientious and determined minority which proves to be
the safeguard against outrageous conduct wrought by tides and currents of public opinion."
United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 416 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969). In
a similar vein, a number of authorities have suggested that a defendant has a right to a hung
jury and that the Allen charge jeopardizes that right. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 411
F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970); Huffman v. United States, 297
F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir.) (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 955 (1962); Comment, Instructing the Deadlocked Jury: Some Practical
Considerations, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PROC. 169, 170 (1974).
33 See note 34 supra. The appeal from the bench for a verdict may distort the neutrality
of a trial. By stressing the duty to produce a verdict and by addressing the minority, the
judge, in effect, is involved in jury deliberations. Bennett, The Hung Jury and the Dynamite
Charge, 1 AM. J. CiaM. L. 156, 176-77 (1972). The qualifications in the charge do not save it
from being "a direct appeal from the Bench for a verdict." Thaggard v. United States, 354
F.2d 735, 740 (5th Cir. 1965) (Coleman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966).
11 Since the decision by the Supreme Court in Allen, see note 2 supra, the Court has twice
upheld, without comment, verdicts rendered after delivery of an Allen charge. See Kawakita
v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952); Lias v. United States, 284 U.S. 584 (1931)(per curiam).
Since 1952, certiorari has been denied in all cases involving theAllen charge. See, e.g., United
19781
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and without definitive empirical proof establishing that the charge
is coercive, 37 courts are understandably reluctant to declare the
Allen charge unconstitutional per se.38 Nevertheless, the repetition
of the charge to dissenting jurors raises grave questions concerning
fulfillment of the right to trial by impartial jury39 and the require-
ment that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt."
Interference with the operation of the appellate system may
arise from the fact that variations in the wording of the Allen charge
often lead to appeals by convicted defendants.4 The resultant drain
on appellate resources has prompted three circuits to act in their
supervisory capacity 2 and prohibit further use of the charge.4 3 Other
States v. Hynes, 424 F.2d 754 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 933 (1970); United States v.
Wynn, 415 F.2d 135 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 994 (1970); United States v.
Brown, 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970); Thaggard v. United
States, 354 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966).
3 See note 22 supra.
11 See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 480 F.2d 518, 519 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (Coleman,
J., concurring); Comment, The Faltering Allen Charge and its Proposed Replacement, 16 ST.
Louis L.J. 619, 622-23 (1972). One appellate judge has argued, in dissent, that "[s]ince the
Supreme Court has not disavowed the charge it is not for us to do so." United States v.
Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1971)(en banc) (Robb, J., dissenting); accord, Hodges
v. United States, 408 F.2d 543, 552 (8th Cir. 1969) (Blackmun, J.).
See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
40 See Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 275 A.2d 299 (1971); Note, The Allen
Charge Dilemma, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 637 (1972). See generally Comment, Instructing
Deadlocked Juries In Light of the Trial of Juan Corona, 53 ORE. L. REv. 213 (1974). The
Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the notion that proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt is of constitutional dimension. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Mulla-
ney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
" An examination "of the decisions of the several federal courts of appeals in recent years
leaves no doubt that these courts are spending increasing amounts of time struggling with a
host of problems created by continued use of the Allen charge." ABA STANDARDs RELATING
To TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4, commentary at 155 (Approved Draft, 1968). The administrative
problems caused by the Allen charge have prompted courts to act in their supervisory capac-
ity and prohibit its use. See note 43 infra. For a survey of state courts which have abandoned
the charge, see United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159, 1162 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977).
1Z The Supreme Court has stated that "supervisory control of the District Courts by the
Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper judicial administration in the federal system." La
Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259-60 (1957). Though not clearly defined by the
Court, the supervisory powers of courts of appeals were recently explained by Mr. Justice
Rehnquist:
Within such a unitary jurisdictional framework the appellate court will, of
course, require the trial court to conform to constitutional mandates, but it may
likewise require it to follow procedures deemed desirable from the viewpoint of
sound judicial practice although in nowise commanded by statute or by the Consti-
tution.
Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973).
In United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 431 U.S. 937 (1977),
the Second Circuit invoked its supervisory power to affirm the suppression of a potential
defendant's grand jury testimony and the dismissal of a perjury charge. The purpose of the
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courts of appeals have prescribed modifications in the language and
use of the original Allen charge;" none have upheld its unsolicited
decision was to encourage uniformity of practice between strike force attorneys and the
United States Attorney for the same district. The court stated that such an exercise of power
is clearly recognized in the Second Circuit. 547 F.2d at 776. Noting that the Third, Seventh,
and District of Columbia Circuits have utilized their supervisory powers to prohibit further
use of the Allen charge, the Jacobs court concluded: "These cases surely do not demonstrate
a disrespect for the Supreme Court. They perhaps, in part, represent a recognition of the
undesirability of unequal treatment, as evidenced by many appeals, when some judges use
the Allen charge and others do not." Id.
The Third Circuit has explained its supervisory power to be "little more than ruling on
a basis not specifically set forth in the Constitution, or by statute, procedural rule, or prece-
dent." In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 507 F.2d 963, 970 (3d Cir. 1975) (Aldisert, J., dissent-
ing). The other courts of appeals, like the Second and Third Circuits, have acknowledged the
exisence of this power. See Burton v. United States, 483 F.2d 1182, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 1973).
" Three circuits have banned the Allen charge for administrative reasons; none of the
three specifically ruled, however, on the charge's constitutionality. The Third Circuit in
United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969), prohibit-
ing further use of the charge stated that "[ilts peccancy comes from its tendency to hurt,
from its tendency to erode the jurors' capacity for meaningful group deliberation with its
concomitant arguing, influencing, and exchange of views." 412 F.2d at 420,
The Seventh Circuit abandoned the Allen charge in the "interests of justice." United
States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970). The
court noted the administrative problems in evaluating the coercive effects of the instruction.
Recognizing that some instruction is often necessary, the court prospectively adopted a
charge consistent with the standards set forth by the American Bar Association. 411 F.2d at
933-34.
The District of Columbia Circuit, following the lead of the Third and Seventh Circuits,
declared that "[w]e believe that appellate courts should no longer be burdened with the
necessities and niceties-and the concomitant uncertainties-of gauging various Allen-type
renditions in terms of the coerciveness of their impact." United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d
1177, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc). Noting that an earlier recommendation urging trial
judges to stay within the strict limits of Allen, Fulwood v. United States, 369 F.2d 960, 963
(D.C. Cir. 1966)(Burger, J.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 934 (1967), had not been followed, the
Thomas court adopted the ABA standard. 449 F.2d at 1187.
" The circuits that have retained the Allen charge have, for the most part, tempered it.
The First Circuit requires that the jury majority, as well as the dissenters, be instructed to
reexamine their views. See United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880, 883 (1st Cir. 1971).
Moreover, according to that court, a supplemental instruction ought to remind the jury of
the burden of proof required for conviction. Id.; accord, United States v. Angiulo, 485 F.2d
37 (1st Cir. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 497 F.2d 440 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974);
Pugliano v. United States, 348 F.2d 902 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 939 (1965). The
Fourth Circuit also has urged the use of a modified Allen charge that addresses the majority
and the minority jurors. United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1342 & n.7 (4th Cir. 1970).
The Eighth Circuit has encouraged trial judges to ensure that all possible safeguards are
observed so that jurors will adhere to conscientious beliefs. United States v. Pope, 415 F.2d
685 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 950 (1970). It has been suggested by the Tenth
Circuit that if the Allen charge is utilized at all, it should be given in the original predelibera-
tion instructions. United States v. Wynn, 415 F.2d 135 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
994 (1970).
Though the Fifth Circuit has retained the Allen charge, individual judges within the
circuit have strongly urged a contrary position. See Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735
(5th Cir. 1965) (Coleman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966); Andrews v.
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use a second time.45 Indeed, only months before the Robinson deci-
sion, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Seawell,4" held that it
is reversible error to repeat an Allen charge after a jury has reported
itself deadlocked and has not requested a second instruction.47 After
noting that a single Allen charge, although valid in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, is "inherently coercive,"" the Seawell court concluded that
sanctioning a repetition of the charge would amount to "an unwar-
ranted expansion of its use."49 In so ruling, the court expressly re-
jected the conclusion reached in Robinson that case-by-case appel-
late review of the propriety of a second supplemental instruction
would be acceptable."
The Second Circuit holding in Robinson therefore is at variance
with the current trend evident in judicial decisions.5 1 Of the three
United States, 309 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1962) (Wisdom, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
946 (1963); Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.) (Brown, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955 (1962). More recently, the Fifth Circuit,
in a sharply divided en banc decision, affirmed use of the Allen charge. United States v.
Bailey, 480 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1973)(en banc)(per curiam).
"I See United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159, 1163 n.10 (9th Cir. 1977).
550 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1163. After more than 32 hours of deliberation, the Seawell jury sent a note to
the judge indicating a ten-to-two deadlock. The judge responded with a standard Allen charge
which made reference to the expense of the trial and alluded to a future retrial. While the
court stressed the need for a conscientious verdict, it also asked the minority to reexamine
their views and noted that they had a duty to reach agreement if possible without surrender-
ing honest convictions. See id. at 1161 n.2. Since it specifically addressed the minority jurors,
the Seawell instruction was somewhat more forceful than the one delivered in Robinson. See
note 24 supra. The first Seawell instruction did not result in a jury verdict, however, and 3
1/2 hours later the jury again reported itself at an impasse. The court reread the Allen charge
and a verdict was returned 50 minutes later. 550 F.2d at 1162.
11 550 F.2d at 1162. In adopting the rule that delivery of an unsolicited second Allen
charge is reversible error, the court acknowledged that some cases not warranting such protec-
tion would nevertheless be automatically reversed. On balance, this "cost" of embracing a
per se rule was found to be less weighty than the defendant's right to an impartial jury trial
and the administrative inconvenience of a less definite rule. Id. at 1163 n.8.
" Id. at 1163.
' Id. The court stated that "[p]ragmatic considerations weigh against the application"
of the usual test of considering all the circumstances to determine the propriety of the charge
when it is given more than once. Id.
11 See notes 43-50 and accompanying text supra. The Second Circuit has consistently
reaffirmed its adherence to the Allen charge. See, e.g., United States v. Tyers, 487 F.2d 828
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 971 (1974) (instruction that law requires retrial unless
unanimous verdict rendered not coercive); United States v. Martinez, 446 F.2d 118 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 944 (1971) (rejection of arguments by other circuits and commentators
that Allen charge should be prohibited); United States v. Hynes, 424 F.2d 754 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 933 (1970) (Allen charge is satisfactory supplemental jury charge); United
States v. Meyers, 410 F.2d 693 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969) (admonishment
that jurors should not relinquish conscientious beliefs sufficient to balance the Allen charge's
coercive tendencies). But cf. United States v. Kenner, 354 F.2d 780, 783-84 (2d Cir. 1965),
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circuits which have abandoned the Allen charge,-" two, the Sev-
enth and the District of Columbia,53 have opted for guidelines estab-
lished by the American Bar Association.54 While no particular lan-
guage is mandated in these circuits,55 the more coercive aspects of
the Allen charge have been discarded. Since the instruction may be
given prior to deliberation," no reference is made to dissenting ju-
rors.57 Instead, the instruction states that no juror should hesitate
to reexamine his views.58 Later repetition of the instruction is per-
missible if the jury cannot agree. 9 Insasmuch as all jurors are ad-
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966) (the propriety of particular charge given was seriously
questioned because of its possible coercive impact).
See note 43 supra.
See United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc); United States
v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970).
" The guidelines are contained in ABA STANDARDs RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4
(Approved Draft, 1968). The ABA standard provides:
5.4 Length of deliberations; deadlocked jury.
(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may give an instruction
which informs the jury:
(i) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto;
(ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to
deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without
violence to individual judgment;
(iii) that each juror must decide the case for himself, but only after
an impartial consideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors;
(iv) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate
to reexamine his own views and change his opinion if convinced it is
erroneous; and
(v) that no juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the
weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his fellow
jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to agree, the court
may require the jury to continue their deliberations and may give or repeat an
instruction as provided in subsection (a). The court shall not require or threaten to
require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable
intervals.
(c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a verdict if it
appears that there is no reasonable probability of agreement.
Id. at 145-46. The ABA recommends that the Allen charge not be used; instead, the jury
should be advised of the five points contained in the standard. Id., commentary at 146. Giving
the instruction prior to the deliberative process is advised and its later repetition is within
the discretion of the trial judge. Id. at 147. An illustrative charge conforming to the ABA
guidelines is Instruction 8.11 of Jury Instructions and Forms for Federal Criminal Cases, 27
F.R.D. 39, 97-98 (1961).
0' See United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc); United States
v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970).
ABA STANDARms RaETLING TO TRIAL BY JuRY § 5.4(a) (Approved Draft, 1968).
See note 54 supra.
" Id.
"'Id.
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dressed before the deliberative process, the instruction seems to
have less coercive potential. As use of a more neutral charge should
prove less vulnerable to constitutional attack, the administration of
criminal justice is thereby benefited.
The Second Circuit holding in Robinson, that the unsolicited
use of a second Allen charge is not per se reversible error, seems to
compound the constitutional problems associated with a single
Allen charge. In recognition of this factor, the Ninth Circuit has laid
down a per se rule, finding the unsolicited use of a second charge
inconsistent with the rights guaranteed by the sixth amendment."0
Viewed from the perspective of judicial economy, the Allen charge
has been found to impede the efficient operation of the appellate
process.6 ' As the Second Circuit neglected to specify the circumstan-
ces in which the use of a second Allen charge would be proper, the
court has invited variations in its use by trial judges, thereby in-
creasing the likelihood of appeals. It is therefore regrettable that the
Second Circuit declined to invoke its supervisory power and adopt
the alternative instruction utilized by the Seventh and District of
Columbia Circuits. Hopefully, the division among the circuits as to
the viability of the charge, coupled with the sharp criticism its use
has provoked, will lead to Supreme Court review of the Allen charge
in the near future.
Richard P. Smith
0 United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977).
61 See notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra.
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